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ANALYSIS

Reconciling
Fairness
and
Racial
Preference
,, I

nd ividuals who believe their
rigbts have been violated are entitled to their day in court ,"
Pre ident George Bush declared earlier
this spring , speaking of white males who
feel aggrieved by affirmative-action plans .
" [E]mployers who seek to comply with
the law by remedying past discrimination
[should not be subjected] to a neverending stream of litigation and potential
liability , " wrote Justice John Paul Stevens
in a di senting Supreme Court opinion last
year.
Both the president and the justice are
correct, and therein lies a headache: balancing the rights o f white employees
against the rights and interests of minority
employees and employers who attempt to
remedy race discrimination through racecon cious hiring and promotion. Indeed,
whether and when whites should be allowed to bring reverse-discrimination
suits to challenge consent decrees and
litigated judgments arising out of earlier
race-discrimination suits is one of the
more controversial questions raised by the
civil-rights bill now before Congress.
The answer provided by the proposed
Civil Right Act of 1990--to bar such
challenge outright in most cases--is, by
and large, fitting . Without such bars, endless rever e-discrimi nation suits against
affinnative-action hiri ng and promotion
provisions in decrees and judgments will
prevent the re olution of race-discrimination cases.
Still, the bill's opponent have a valid
concern: binding those who were not partie and who had never even heard about
tbe earlier suit threatens to violate basic
principles offaime s.
The de bate was spawned last year by
the Supreme Court's decision in Martin v.
Wilks, 109 S . Ct. 2 180 (1 989). Before this
decision , federal courts genera1Jy barred
white employees who did not intervene in
a n emplo ym ent-d is c r im i na t ion s uit
brought by minority employees under Title VII of the C ivil Rights Act o f 1964
from later challenging any race-conscious
order arising out of the suit. In Wilks, the
hi gh court struck down this j udge-made
" impermissible collateral attack " rule .
The majority opinion , written by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist (the d issent was
Justice Stevens', quoted above), held that
white employees who are not parties to a
suit are not obliged to intervene; instead ,
the original parties must bring the white
employees into the suit (through the join-
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If an affirmative-action plan is to
work, it cannot be subject to endless
challenges by white men who
disagree with its goals. Yet these
complainants have a right to a day in
court. The pending civil-rights bill
can accommodate both principles.
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der provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure). Only then can the white
employees, as parties , be bound by the
outcome of the case.

It sounds simple- but the notion that
joinder of white employees is a realistic
solution to the problem of interminable
reverse-discrimination litigation is dis-

ingenuous. In fact , after Wilks , there are
no practical limits on the ability of white
employees to challenge affmnative action .
If the origi nal parties to the original
race-discrimination suit-the one brought
by minority employees--folJow the Wilks
drill and join all white employees , the
prospect of a settlement that will actually
bind all parties is unlikely . This is because
a 1986 Supreme Court decision held that
even white employees who are parties to a
suit are not bound by a consent decree unless they consent to the terms of the decree . Joinder and an opportunity to be
heard are not enough to bind them.
Thus, there is nothing partie to a Title
VII suit can do to ensure that an affirmative-action plan will go into and remain in
effect. The aftermath of Wilks has already
been a wave of collateral attacks across the
country.
SEE RACIAL PREfERENCE, PAGE 24
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RACIAL PREFERENCE FROM PAGE 23

The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990
responds to this vexing problem by adopting the impermissible collateral attack
doctrine as statutory law. Under the bill ,
three categories of employees would be
barred from bringing reverse-discrimination suits challenging affirmative-action
plans arising out of Title VII cases:
• Category J: Those with sufficient
notice and an opportunity to object at the
time the decree or judgment was entered.
• Category 2: Those whose interests
were sufficiently represented in the original suit by a person who challenged the
decree or judgment.
• Category 3: Those without actual
notice if the court determined before entering the decree or judgment that reasonable efforts had been made to give no~ice
to interested people. The bill states, without specifying procedures, that the notice
should be consistent with the " constitutional requirements" of due process .
The first and second categories are reasonable and sufficiently clear; the third is
problematic.
The constitutional standard for binding
persons who did not receive notice of a
suit was established by the Supreme Court
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust, 339
U.S. 306 (1950). In that case, the Court
said it would apply a "reasonable-underthe-circumstances" test to the issue. In the
context of race-conscious remedies for
employment discrimination , this test
would seem to require both that the best
possible effort was made to notify the
absentees and that the interests of the
absentees were protected in the original
litigation.
If Category 3's reference to "constitutional requirements" is read to incorporate
this Mullane standard into the bill, then
that category would be no more than a restatement of Category 2. If, however,
Category 3 has any independent meaning,
it must mean that unnotified persons
whose interests were not adequately represented by parties in the first suit may
nonetheless be bound. That flies in the
face of Mullane , however, and would result in binding absentees who had absolutely no idea-and no reason to knowthat the original suit was under way and
whose interests were not represented before the court (such as individuals who
were not employees at the time of the
suit).

Retooled 'Fairness Hearing'
A good solution to this due-process
problem would be to devise a new type of
"fairness hearing"-a variation on the
hearing that traditionally precedes entry of
a consent decree-specifically to protect
the absent, unrepresented Category 3 in-

A good solution
to this dueprocess problem
would be to
devise anew
type of 'fairness
hearing.'
dividuals. The hearing would be required
both for cases that are settled and for those
that are litigated to final judgment.
In a traditional fairness hearing , the
court may hear from certain non-parties,
such as white employees, who are likely to
be affe9ted by a consent decree. Such
hearings should focus on whether the
proposed decree comports with the requirements of United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S .

267 (1986), and other Supreme Court
cases governing voluntary affirmativeaction plans.
Under Weber, voluntary affirmative
action must be a response to "a manifest
imbalance" in "traditionally segregated
job categories" and may not "unnecessarily trammel the rights of the majority ."

Permitting
open-ended
collateral
challenges
nullifies the
positive effects
of Title VII.
Wygant and other precedents require that,
in the case of court-ordered or governmental affmnative action, the discrimination must have been committed by the
employer rather than by society at large.
A retooled fairness hearing would ensure that the court receives the benefits of
advocacy addressing these legal/fairness
standards on behalf of the absent Category
3 individuals, despite the absence of an
adequate representative. If this were
achieved , a ban on subsequent reversediscrimination suits by these employees
would be justified.
The difficulty, of course, is in creating a
mechanism that protects the interests of
non-parties who are by definition not only
absent, but also unrepresented. Possible
approaches to developing such a mechanism are:
• Human intervention. An amicus,
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (where the EEOC is not a
party), could be appointed by the court to
argue on behalf of unnamed people potentially affected. A major question , of
course, is who would pay.
• Structural correction. Judges might
follow specific guidelines crafted by an
entity like the EEOC , an independent
commission, or an office within the judiciary in assessing affmnative-action plans.
One problem with this alternative is that
the best-intentioned judge may miss a
point an interested litigant would uncover.
For this reason, the guidelines woUld have
to reflect the results of careful study of real
cases, so that the court would be alerted to
arguments that might have been made if an
interested party were there to make them.
• Legality check. The judiciary could
employ a centralized system for expert
review of consent decrees. The EEOC,
when not a party, might serve in this capacity <>r might coordinate such a system.
One problem with this alternative is expense, although money could be saved if
think tanks and academic institutions
could be signed up to provide expertise on
a pro bono basis .
• Legal presumption. A presumption
could be worked into the fairness hearing
against approval of the consent decree or
judgment in question. The prime difficulty
with this is that it would undermine a
heretofore clearly expressed congressional
preference for settlements.
None of these is perfect, but neither is
endless litigation over consent decrees.
Permitting open-ended collateral challenges nullifies the positive institutional
effects of Title VII; prohibiting challenges
by white employees who .were absent and
unrepresented when an affmnative-action
plan was implemented takes too much
from the majority to protect the minority.
The solution is not Justice Rehnquist's
wholesale rejection of the collateral-attack rule , but a new system that includes
real and enforceable protections of the
majority.
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